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853 
THE WISDOM AND MORALITY OF PRESENT-DAY 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
Joshua Dressler∗ 
First, let me just say how much I have enjoyed being on campus 
these last two days.  I thank the Dean, the criminal law faculty, and the 
students who have participated in the classes I have taught here these 
two days.  And, I most especially want to thank Professor Margery 
Koosed who worked exceptionally hard pulling everything together.  I 
will only say that she is a real “mensch” and if you need me to translate 
that, I will gladly do so after this lecture.  In short, I have greatly enjoyed 
being here. 
Today I want to talk about criminal sentencing and its connection, 
or I fear lack of connection, to basic principles of punishment that are 
supposed to make our system rational and morally just.  Let’s keep in 
mind that, everyday, in courts all over the country, judges are sentencing 
persons to prison.  They are doing that in our name.  Punishment—
sentencing people to prison—involves intentionally inflicting pain on 
persons by denying them liberty, which we all value, and separating 
them from their community.  Certainly, we need to care about why we 
do this, to be sure there are justifications for treating people this way. 
Now I think we know that there are two general theories or 
justifications for punishment and sentencing.  First, utilitarianism.  
Utilitarians believe that the purpose of all laws is to maximize the net 
happiness of society.  Laws, all laws, should be used to exclude as far as 
possible all painful or unpleasant events.  To a utilitarian, both crime and 
punishment are unpleasant and therefore, generally speaking, 
undesirable.  In a perfect world we wouldn’t have crime or punishment.  
It isn’t a perfect world, of course, and there are people disposed to 
commit crimes.  Therefore, utilitarians believe that the infliction of pain 
 
∗ Professor Joshua Dressler holds the Frank R. Strong Chair in Law at The Ohio State University 
College of Law.  This lecture was delivered at the University of Akron School of Law on April 1, 
2004. 
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in the form of punishment is justifiable if, but only if, it is expected to 
result in a net reduction of pain of crime that otherwise would occur. 
The second primary justification for punishment and sentencing is 
retribution.  Retributivists believe that punishment is justified when it is 
deserved.  It is deserved when the wrongdoer freely chooses to violate 
society’s rules.  To an uncompromising retributivist, the wrongdoer 
should be punished whether or not it will result in a net reduction of 
crime.  This act of punishment is required, to retributivists, because of 
the moral desert of the wrongdoer. 
Now, the debate between retribution and utilitarianism applies on 
different levels.  I think, probably, that most people today would say that 
the basis for our criminal justice system—that is, the reason why the 
legislature defines crimes, why the police try to arrest those who 
committed the crimes, and why we developed a court system to 
adjudicate and impose punishment for those crimes—is primarily 
utilitarian, not retributivist.  We have defined the crimes, for example 
murder, not because we want to go out and punish murderers, but 
because we hope the threat of punishment will cause people not to 
murder in the first place. 
On the other hand, if one looks carefully at the rules of criminal 
law, the rules you learn in law school—the requirement that a person not 
be punished in the absence of voluntary conduct; the requirement of 
mens rea, a guilty mind; and when one looks at the various defenses to 
crimes—are far easier to explain pursuant to retributive principles than 
utilitarian ones.  In other words, once we set up the criminal justice 
system, perhaps on utilitarian grounds,  the determination of who should 
be punished, namely only those who act voluntarily with a guilty mind 
and without justification or excuse,  and in determining how much 
punishment is just, retributive justice is the key.  This means that ideally, 
in a just system, the punishment we potentially inflict for violations of 
the law should only occur if, first, the wrongdoer caused harm to society, 
and second, he or she morally deserves to be punished. Here, then, we 
turn to the subject for today, sentencing. 
The amount of punishment we impose should be roughly 
proportional to the crime, taking into consideration the harm the person 
caused and his or her moral blameworthiness in causing it.  Now having 
said that, this does not mean that utilitarianism has no role in sentencing.  
One scholar, the late Norval Morris, felt that retribution and 
utilitarianism could and should work together.  His basic point was this: 
retributivists cannot tell us exactly how much punishment is 
proportionate to a crime.  I mean, how many years of punishment are 
2
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proportionate to a robbery, or a rape?  Is it 5 years, is it 14 years, is it 7.2 
years?  We can’t answer that question precisely, if we are retributivists.  
But retributivists can set parameters.  We know intuitively that a certain 
amount of punishment is too much for a particular crime, and that some 
punishment is too low because it trivializes the offense.  That sets your 
retributive parameters: you impose no fewer than X number of years for 
a particular crime, but no more than Y number of years for the offense.  
Within those parameters, Norval Morris would argue, if a society 
wishes, it can choose to apply utilitarian considerations—weighing 
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation—but retribution set the 
parameters.  Now I, Joshua Dressler, might prefer to exclude all 
utilitarian considerations, but certainly a legislator has every right if he 
or she chooses to apply utilitarian factors, but retribution should set the 
top and bottom limits. 
The problem is there is little evidence that lawmakers set penalties 
in this sort of coherent manner.  Typically, lawmakers apply no theory of 
punishment at all in setting penalties.  They apply the “What do I need to 
get re-elected?” principle.  And it is always easier to appear to be tough 
on crime than to develop sensible penalties.  This process of increasing 
penalties, and then increasing them some more, and then increasing them 
again—despite all utilitarian or retributive arguments to the contrary—
has been going on in the United States for at least the last quarter century 
in a manner that should put this country to shame.  In 2001, nearly two 
million men and women were in the United States penal system.  That is 
a per capita rate of 690 persons per 100,000 population.  That compares 
690 per capita, to a 79 per capita rate as recently as the mid-1970s.  In 
other words, we have experienced a 900% increase in the incarceration 
rate in this country in the past thirty years.  There is simply no utilitarian 
or retributive justification for this momentous change. 
Nowhere, perhaps, are sentencing rules worse than in the federal 
system.  As a result of sentencing “reforms” in the 1980s, and I put 
quotation marks around the term “reforms,” we now have the much 
reviled Federal Sentencing Guidelines, hundreds of pages long, that 
require a federal judge to proceed through a complex seven-step 
sentencing process that ultimately leads to a Table at the end that tells 
judges basically what sentence they should impose.  Supposedly, the 
Guidelines follow largely retributive principles.  In actuality, they do 
not. 
First, the essence of retribution, the expression of moral 
condemnation, has been largely lost because of the Guidelines.  Let me 
read a quote from Professor Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes, who 
3
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have observed that before guidelines existed, observers of sentencing 
proceedings in federal courts: 
 
witnessed a ritual of undeniable moral significance. . . . The 
audience included victims, their families and friends, the family 
and friends of the defendant, the general public. . . . But the 
judge addressed only one person when imposing a sentence. . . .  
This solemn confrontation was predicated on the fundamental 
understanding that only a person [here, a judge] can pass moral 
judgment, and only a person can be morally judged.1 
 
But under the Guidelines, the judges have little discretion; they just 
have a mechanistic seven-step process for calculating a punishment. 
They may as well be a calculator as a judge.  As Judge Cabranes and 
Professor Stith go on: 
 
The guidelines have replaced the traditional judicial role of 
deliberation and moral judgment . . . with complex quantitative 
calculations that convey the impression of scientific precision 
and objectivity.  The judge on the elevated bench remains a 
visible symbol of society’s moral authority, but the substance 
and meaning of this ancient staging is gone in most cases. . . .  
With a far more limited role, the federal trial judge in today’s 
sentencing ritual has little or no opportunity to consider the 
overall culpability of the defendant before him.  The Guidelines 
themselves determine not only which factors are relevant (and 
irrelevant) in criminal punishment, but also, in most 
circumstances, the precise quantitative relevance of each factor.2 
 
In short, the essence, the core of retribution, which requires that we 
look not just at the harm caused, but also at the very individualized 
factors relating to the defendant’s moral culpability, are gone —in favor 
of a system that fails to treat the defendant as unique, and instead treats 
the defendant as a member of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be 
subjected to a set of entirely depersonalized guidelines.3 
 
 1. KATE STITH & JOSÉ CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 81-82 (1998). 
 2. Id. at 82-83. 
 3. Since I gave this address, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional aspects of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).  The effect of 
Booker is that the Guidelines are now advisory to the judges, and not mandatory.  Id. at 757.  Judges 
4
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And, as bad as these Guidelines are, they have been made far worse 
in the last twelve months as a result of the so-called Feeney 
amendments.4  In April 2003, Congress sharply limited further the 
authority of federal judges to issue what are referred to as “downward 
departures.”  After a judge goes through the seven-step process, he or 
she arrives at the Guidelines Tables.  The judge is told there what 
sentence ought to be imposed.  But, the Guidelines permit judges some 
limited authority to go below or above the figures set out in the Tables, 
if their reasons for departure can be justified pursuant to specific 
Guideline rules.  The new amendments to the Guidelines, however, 
provide that judges may not issue downward departures based on a 
convicted defendant’s family circumstances or family responsibilities, or 
because the defendant suffers from diminished capacity, if the defendant 
has been convicted of a sexual offense or a crime against a minor.  The 
new law further directs the United States Sentencing Commission, which 
has the responsibility to update the Guidelines, to promulgate 
amendments that ensure that the incidents of downward departures are 
substantially reduced.  And, meanwhile, there is no such rule or 
recommendation regarding upward departures: there, the judges are not 
limited by the new amendments.  Furthermore, the new legislation 
permits the Attorney General of the United States to monitor the 
downward departure rates of individual judges.  Accordingly, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft issued an amendment to the United States 
Attorney’s Manual, the manual that every federal prosecutor in the 
United States must follow, requiring prosecutors to report to the 
Department of Justice whenever a federal judge issues a sentence falling 
below the sentencing guidelines.  The clear message the Attorney 
General is sending is that factors regarding the defendant that might call 
for mitigation, might call for compassion, are essentially factored out of 
the Guidelines, either expressly or practically now that the Attorney 
General is looking over the shoulders of the federal judges.  In no way, 
in other words, can we say that defendants will likely get their just 
deserts—punishment truly representative of their personal 
blameworthiness. 
Finally, you must add to all of this, a spate of mandatory minimum 
 
now have much greater freedom, post-Booker, to impose sentences they believe are appropriate.  It 
is too soon to know to what extent judges, instructed by the Booker Court to consider seriously the 
now-advisory Guidelines, will diverge from them.  And, of course, Booker invites Congress to re-
enter the picture: whether they will do so remains an open question; and if they do become 
involved, it is unclear whether Congress will seek to enhance or diminish judicial discretion. 
 4. But see,  supra note 3. 
5
Dressler: Present-Day Criminal Sentencing
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
DRESSLER1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:00 AM 
858 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:853 
sentencing provisions enacted by Congress: these are laws that prohibit 
federal judges from imposing sentences below a very high minimum 
number of years of imprisonment, thus reducing judicial discretion 
further.5 
In light of all of this, federal sentencing laws, and state sentencing 
systems to the extent they are modeled after the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, are in clear violation of both utilitarian and retributive 
values. 
Not only are defendants punished more than they deserve under any 
decent retributive system, and far more punishment than is necessary for 
utilitarian purposes, but there are a number of negative side effects.  
First, the Guidelines now result in punishment so grossly 
disproportionate that some judges are rebelling.  A few judges have 
resigned their lifetime positions rather than continue to impose what they 
consider to be draconian sentences.  At least one judge threatened to tell 
a jury in the guilt phase of a trial what sentence the judge would be 
required to impose if the jurors convicted, essentially inviting jurors to 
nullify the law and acquit.  There have been a few stories of juries who 
have nullified the law on their own and acquitted because a particular 
juror either knew or thought he or she knew what the sentence was going 
to be, and convinced the other jurors to acquit.  Thus, people who are 
genuinely guilty of crimes may be acquitted simply in order to avoid 
draconian sentences.  That is no way to run the criminal justice system. 
There is another negative side effect that few people realize, except 
those that are in the criminal law practice.  The substantive criminal law 
recognizes few excuses, and those excuses, like insanity, are very 
narrowly defined.  Now, overall, I happen to think that is good, that we 
ought to recognize few excuses.  I think most people are morally 
responsible for their actions and therefore deserve to be convicted of 
crimes they committed.  But to say that someone deserves to be 
punished is not the same as saying how much punishment they deserve.  
There are factors that should have no place in the guilt phase of the trial, 
but are perfectly appropriate in the sentencing phase to decide whether 
the convicted defendant deserves full or less punishment.  But, in any 
sentencing system that bars mitigating evidence, or which makes it 
exceptionally hard for a judge to take such factors into consideration, the 
ultimate real world practical effect is that defense lawyers have no 
 
 5. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), in no way invalidates mandatory minimum laws.  Indeed, 
Congress may be tempted to add more such laws to reduce judicial discretion and to counteract 
Booker. 
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choice but to raise such claims, claims that belong in the sentencing 
phase, in the guilt phase in order to push courts to expand the number of 
excuses recognized in the law—to create new excuses, or to make the 
current excuses broader.  When sentencing provisions fail to allow 
judges to consider morally relevant factors in sentencing, it is inevitable 
that any good and ethical defense attorney will try to squeeze such 
claims into the only other place available, the guilt phase of the trial. 
But, such efforts delay the trial process and may ultimately distort the 
law.  We may end up creating defenses when really we shouldn’t.  
Again, we can’t blame the defense attorneys for making such claims 
when they are effectively prevented from doing so at sentencing. 
In short, we have every reason for being deeply dismayed by the 
sentencing provisions in the federal courts.  Although most state 
sentencing systems are not as distorted as the federal system, I think it is 
fair to say that virtually all state legislators nationwide are guilty of 
following the “I am tough on criminals” approach to sentencing, rather 
than developing sentencing provisions that are rational under utilitarian 
theory, or humane under retributivist theory.  Again, I start with what I 
said in the beginning: these sentences that are imposed in Ohio courts, 
Michigan courts, federal courts, occurring in our name.  And if the 
sentences are irrational, or if they are unjust and immoral, we are 
responsible.  Quite starkly, we are not providing justice. 
Now, I want to add a few additional remarks about another aspect 
of sentencing: sentencing people to death.  I think it is fair to say that 
there are few modern issues, and almost certainly none in the field of 
criminal justice, that are deeper, more provocative, more troubling, and 
more controversial than the question of whether and when our society 
should execute persons convicted of first degree murder.  The 
constitutional issues are well settled: the death penalty is not 
unconstitutional per se.  None of the nine justices currently serving on 
the Court disagree with that statement.  The issue today relates to 
nonconstitutional issues, the wisdom and/or morality of the death 
penalty.  So, in the few more minutes that I have remaining, I would like 
to reflect on those matters, on the wisdom and morality of the death 
penalty.  I stress I am only reflecting.  Many of you may disagree with 
what I have to say. 
I want to start the same way as I started my earlier talk, and that is 
on the justifiability of the death penalty.  That has to be considered, 
again, by considering the two basic theories of punishment.  Usually we 
ask two questions: Is the threat of the death penalty a general deterrent 
and/or is the actual infliction of the death penalty retributively justified?  
7
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First, general deterrence.  In 1976, when the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty, that very same 
Court on that very same day observed, and I am quoting the Court now, 
“[T]here is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or 
refuting this view [that is, that death is a significantly greater deterrent 
than lesser penalties].”6  Since 1976, nothing has changed, except that 
almost every study since then seems to support the conclusion that it is 
not a general deterrent.  It is probably fair to say that the consensus 
among criminologists today is that there is no scientific basis for the 
claim that the death penalty is a general deterrent. 
But here is the gist of the point.  To utilitarians, pain, whether in the 
form of crime or punishment, is bad, unless its infliction results in a net 
reduction of future pain.  In other words to a true utilitarian, the burden 
of proof is on those who would impose the death penalty and its 
resulting pain, and not on those who would abolish this punishment.  
Until we have good reason to believe that the death penalty deters more 
successfully than life imprisonment, until we have that evidence from a 
utilitarian perspective, we shouldn’t defend the death penalty. 
But that is hardly the end of the discussion on capital punishment, 
because I don’t believe most proponents of the death penalty rely on 
deterrence for their position.  I think most people want to ask and answer 
the second question, is the death penalty retributively justified?  At first 
blush, it is hard to argue with a claim that killers deserve the death 
penalty.  If one believes in the literal biblical principle of lex talionis, of 
an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, killing a killer seems deserved.  
But I am going to suggest that is too simplistic a response.  Here’s why: 
First, few of us really believe in lex talionis.  We don’t really believe we 
should rob the robber, rape the rapist and steal from the thief.  If we 
don’t believe in that, then we have rejected lex talionis, and thus there is 
no reason to believe that the only answer to a murder is to kill the killer. 
What lex talionis in our modern society really means is that 
punishment should be proportionate to the offense committed, not that it 
must be identical.  That is, retribution only requires that the most serious 
offense receive the most serious punishment, the least serious offense 
receive the least serious punishment, and so on.  If we can agree that 
murder is the most serious offense in the penal code, then this only 
means that we must impose on murderers the most serious punishment 
that we as a community are prepared to impose, no less and no more.  
But there is no retributive requirement that the most serious punishment 
 
 6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976). 
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we, as a community are prepared to impose, be death.  It cannot fairly be 
claimed that those states that reject the death penalty are not punishing 
their murderers sufficiently under retributive grounds.  As long as we are 
prepared to say that we are not required to impose lex talionis simply for 
the sake of equality, then it follows that if the harshest punishment that a 
particular community is willing to bear is life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole, then that imposition, that harshest of all 
punishments, is retributively proper.  We certainly do not trivialize the 
seriousness of murder by imposing life in prison. 
But we still might ask is anything short of death really enough?  I 
have lived in a number of states in my life.  I have lived in death penalty 
states, my home state of California and here in Ohio, and I have lived in 
nondeath penalty states, Minnesota and Michigan.  If you carefully 
listen, as I have, to families of murder victims, what they almost always 
say in every state is that what they want is justice for their loved one.  
Now “justice” doesn’t have to mean kill, it means, “treat my loved one 
with respect,” which we do when we say to a convicted killer, “You 
have committed the most heinous crime on our books.  We will therefore 
impose the most severe punishment that we impose in our community.”  
If you talk to family members, for example in Minnesota, what you 
typically find is that they are satisfied, they feel their needs are met, 
when the murderer receives that community’s, Minnesota’s, most severe 
punishment of life imprisonment.  The victim’s family feels its loss has 
been properly recognized by the community and by their neighbors, 
because that is as far as Minnesota is prepared to go.  The family 
members say, in essence, “Okay, you have imposed the most severe 
penalty available in our community.  That is all I can ask.” 
It is claimed, however, by some that we must execute the killers for 
the sake of the families of the victims, to give them emotional closure 
when the murderer is put to death.  It is said that such closure does not 
occur if we only sentence the defendant to life in prison.  Here I would 
like to quote Larry Marshall from Northwestern University, from an 
article to be published next week in the Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law.  It is a long quote but I would like to read it to you because it is so 
much on point to this issue.  He writes: 
 
[T]he claim is made that executions are essential for the families 
of some murder victims to heal.  This assertion is often 
advanced by family members themselves, and there is a natural 
resistance to challenge the thesis for fear of appearing callous or 
insensitive to the views of the victims who have suffered so 
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much pain.  To the extent that important public policy issues are 
at stake, though, it is essential to subject the healing/closure 
argument to critical analysis.  We should do this with great 
sensitivity and compassion for those who have been victimized.  
Nonetheless, we must conduct the inquiry rigorously. . . . That 
sober inquiry reveals that the goals of promoting healing among 
the families of murder victims cannot justify the continued use 
of capital punishment.  There is simply no evidence that 
executions deliver on their promise of promoting the 
psychological welfare of murder victims’ families. . . . [T]here is 
no evidence that families of murder victims in non-death 
states . . . endure more lasting pain than families of murder 
victims in death states such as . . . Ohio.  Remember also that 
only two percent of all murderers are punished with the death 
penalty, even in death penalty states.  If we really believed that 
executions were essential to the well-being of victims’ families, 
how could we betray these other 98% by depriving them of 
healing?  Not one study of which I am aware, [Marshall writes], 
has ever found that the psychological health of families in cases 
in which executions have been imposed is better than in cases in 
which life sentences are imposed.7 
 
Basically, we give these terribly hurt families the promise that 
execution will lead to closure, and then, after execution, it isn’t there.  
The horrible reality is that people never totally get over what happened, 
whether the killer is executed or sentenced to prison for life.  And if you 
think about it, if emotional closure is supposed to happen only upon 
execution, then this means that when the murderer is convicted there is 
no emotional closure: family members must wait for the “closure” of the 
execution.  But how long must they wait?  They must wait years and 
years and years—and it will always take years to execute murderers 
because of the right of defendants to appeal, and the difficulty in finding 
attorneys to represent them on appeals.  Closure can’t even start, then, 
for eight or ten or more years.  And then they see the execution, and they 
still don’t have closure.  At least with life imprisonment, the moment the 
person is convicted and sent off to prison for the rest of his life, the 
family members know nothing more is going to happen.  They need not 
wait for an execution.  Whatever closure can happen, can start 
 
 7. Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 573, 582-83 (2004). 
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immediately.  The family can start to resume your life. Do they heal?  
Tragically, no.  They don’t heal either way. 
Let me move on to two final and related reasons why executing 
killers ought to give us all pause, even those who are otherwise in favor 
of the death penalty.  And both relate in some way to innocence.  As you 
may know, mandatory death penalty statutes, that is, statutes that 
provide that all first degree murderers must be executed, were declared 
unconstitutional in 1976 by the same Supreme Court that otherwise said 
the death penalty is constitutional.8  The law is that only “the worst of 
the worst” may be executed.  But I am going to submit that that is not 
just a constitutional principle, it is a moral and retributively required 
principle—only the worst of the worst should be executed.  Let me read 
one paragraph to you from the Supreme Court.  The justices said in 
terms of the Constitution, that there must be: 
 
particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character 
and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition 
upon him of a sentence of death. . .  A process that accords no 
significance to [such factors] excludes . . . the possibility of 
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse 
frailties of humankind.9 
 
And here we have the essence, the Court says “it [meaning a system 
that would justify the death penalty for all murderers] treats all 
persons . . . not as unique human beings, but as members of a faceless, 
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the 
penalty of death.”10 
Ultimately, this is the significant point under retributive principles: 
punishment should be proportional to the offense.  But “offense” means 
not just the social harm caused, killing a person, but the personal moral 
blameworthiness of the person that caused the death.  As we all know, 
we don’t execute a person simply because A killed B.  We don’t say 
“You caused a death. Therefore we will take your life.”  We don’t even 
convict people of crimes simply because A killed B.  A may have killed 
B justifiably in self-defense, or A may have killed B excusably because 
of insanity.  And even when we do punish, the law, as we all know, 
distinguishes between a person who intentionally kills, and, say, a 
 
 8. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating “mandatory death sentence 
statute[s] violat[e] the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore must be set aside”).   
 9. Id. at 303. 
 10. Id. 
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person who negligently kills.  They caused the same harm, but we draw 
a distinction because of the difference in moral culpability.  And even 
between two intentional killings we draw a distinction.  The intentional 
killer who premeditatedly and coldly killed is guilty of first-degree 
murder.  The person who intentionally kills as a result of adequate 
provocation is convicted of manslaughter.  Or, and now we get to the 
point on the death penalty, we do not, or should not, execute killers, even 
intentional killers, if there are aspects of that person’s life, character, or 
circumstances that should cause us to believe that mercy, compassion, or 
justice commands that we spare that person’s life. 
It may be that this person, although legally sane, and therefore 
responsible for his actions, suffers from a mental illness, or has a very 
low IQ, or simply has lived such a horrible life of abuse as a child or an 
adult, that killing them doesn’t seem morally necessary.  The late 
professor John Kaplan, who was a federal prosecutor, once observed: 
 
[T]he more closely one examines their backgrounds [that is, of 
most capital murderers] and what has happened to them as they 
were growing up, the less one feels that it is morally necessary 
to kill them. . . .  Though we certainly do not want anything to 
do with them, there appears to be no moral requirement that we 
injure further one whose humanity has been so diluted over the 
years by past injuries.11 
 
All of these distinctions that I have laid out add up to this general 
point: not all murderers deserve to be killed.  Before we kill a person, we 
are obligated to look deeply, beyond even the facts of the crime, to 
determine who this person is, to look, if you will, into his or her soul and 
determine whether this human is so evil, and whether this person is to 
blame for that evilness, that taking this individual’s life is morally 
justified.  If the answer is no, if that person doesn’t meet that level of 
evilness, then we might call him “death penalty innocent,” even though 
he is guilty of murder. 
And once we accept that we must draw these distinctions, 
constitutional and moral, we have two other questions to answer.  First, 
do any of us in this room have the capacity to make that judgment?  
Many of you will disagree with me when I say that my answer is “no, we 
do not.”  Jurors are being asked to punish as if they were God.  One 
thing I am sure of is that jurors are not God. 
 
 11. John Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 555, 567 (1983). 
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Second, even if you do believe that humans are capable of making 
these God-like moral judgments, we have to ask: Does our criminal 
justice system, does our trial process, provide us with the requisite 
assurance that jurors will be able to distinguish the “death penalty 
innocent” from the others?  Those who know how the criminal justice 
system really works know that in most counties in the United States, 
indigent defendants—and, let us be clear on this, it’s virtually only 
indigent defendants who end up on death row—are not represented by 
skilled, albeit overworked, public defenders, but more often are 
represented by court-appointed lawyers, sometimes from law firms that 
have contracted with the county to represent these indigents.  Some of 
these lawyers have little criminal law experience and often no capital 
murder experience at all, and they are paid so little by the county or state 
that they lack either the incentive or the ability to zealously represent 
their clients as they are ethically obligated to do.  Those who most 
understand the criminal justice system seriously doubt that our justice 
system presently is capable of making the life or death decisions with 
sufficient reliability to permit us to sleep comfortably at night, as we 
execute the thousands of persons now on the death rows in this country. 
Indeed, one of the best reasons to doubt that we can properly 
determine “death penalty innocence” is our growing realization, with the 
advent of DNA, that we are not even able to feel comfortable that we are 
excluding from execution those who are entirely factually innocent of 
murder, much less of capital murder.  And, our error rate has proven 
shocking to even some of the most cynical individuals in criminal law.  
There is a famous quote by Alan Dershowitz, who is certainly a pro-
defense sort of guy, and whom I would consider a fairly cynical sort of 
guy, who believed and wrote at one point that “almost all criminal 
defendants are, in fact guilty,” and that “all criminal defense lawyers, 
prosecutors and judges understand and believe” that.12  It is true that 
most criminal defendants are guilty.  But even he must be shocked, as 
we all are, now that we have DNA, to realize how many times we have 
erred.  Juries have failed; the system has failed, by convicting innocent 
people.  Illinois has imposed a moratorium on the death penalty that 
continues to this day.  Why?  Because they put 25 people on death row 
and it turned out that 13 of the 25 were innocent.  That is 50% plus. 
So, that means that when we start thinking about the 3,500 people 
currently occupying our death rows around this country, we can’t know 
how many of them are entirely innocent of murder.  If our accuracy rate 
 
 12. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982). 
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were 99%, and obviously is isn’t, then that means there are 35 persons 
on death row that are entirely innocent and many more that are “death 
penalty innocent,” and we of course don’t know how many who have 
already been executed fall into one of these categories.  And, if our 
accuracy rate were 97%, then there are more than 100 people who will 
be executed who are entirely innocent.  The question then becomes how 
many innocent people’s lives are we willing to take, in our name, in 
order to kill the genuinely guilty ones?  When we include in the 
calculations those who are guilty of murder but again, undeserving of 
death because they lack that evilness that is required, then it seems to me 
the risk of executing the innocent is extremely high. 
We must remember that the issue before us is not executing them 
versus setting them free.  The issue is executing them versus getting rid 
of the death penalty and sending people to prison for the rest of their 
lives, without the possibility of parole.  Since that’s the issue, then when 
you consider that there may be at least 100 or more persons innocent on 
our death rows, it places a heavy burden on those who would justify the 
death penalty.  And I, at least, don’t think that burden has been satisfied 
yet.  Until it is, at a minimum, we ought to impose a death penalty 
moratorium until we are more comfortable about what we are doing. 
So bottom line, we have, I think, good reason to be deeply troubled 
by our criminal justice system.  We are punishing people in ways I think 
almost impossible to justify on either utilitarian or retributive grounds.  
We are punishing the innocent, and we are punishing the guilty more 
than they deserve, and more than I think society needs or can afford.  
Ultimately, the obligation is on all of us, as voters, as lawyers, as 
citizens, to publicize these inequities so other people learn that they 
exist, and so that we all can do our best to mend the system. 
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